Simply stock trading

Unfortunately months have passed since I found a stock to buy for the gambling portfolio. That happens at market highs. As I charge a “yearly rent” that means I reduce debt a little every time I get that rent. The gambling portfolio is still at a margin multiplier of 127.95%.

Not sure, I think I described the money management for this strategy somewhere in this thread, including the formulas. It sounds a bit complicated but is not: I calculate the minimum of entry price and actual price and the actual value. That gives me two numbers. Then I calculate the multiplier based on the difference of the SP500 from it’s last high, a number between 150 and 300%. This I apply to the two numbers of before. If my debt is in between those numbers I am OK, that is the case at the moment. If it is lower than the lower number I have to buy something, sometimes I buy a second position. If it is higher than the high number I have to sell. That is all.

1 Like

Was looking at US natural gas and downstream industries again. I surprised myself to find I hadn’t already sold CF and NTR. I was looking at whether to add the less well managed LXU to the list. Looking a big further back upstream, TRGP looks interesting though a little pricey.

We haven’t bashed AI in a while.

4 Likes

While everybody is dependent on getting OpenAI and Anthropic money, is there really any doubt that they will successfully IPO and get the tons of money they want to keep the AI trade going?

Sounds like a cool garage band name:   Is There Really Any Doubt   :musical_note:

It’s interesting that Anthropic plans to IPO in October, i.e. before the midterms …
OpenAI filed its confidential S-1 in June (as did Anthropic) but apparently targets 2027 for an IPO.

I have no idea whether they’ll be successful. Probably.

This question is somewhat separate from whether all these other companies betting on OpenAI and Anthropic will ever make an adequate return in their invested capital.
I’m too dumb to know – I’ll therefore put my money into simpler things that are easier to understand.

Anyway, we’re slightly off topic, sorry started the Jenga tower. :wink:

hey lovely people, why did you flee MP?

I’ve boasted there about my second 200->333.33 EXPE round in six months and noone even bat an eye :cry:

1 Like

:clap:

Nice, they don’t even look overpriced. And earnings keep getting revised up.

FASTgraphs

That dividend record looks kinda unrealiable, though, too goofy for Goofy.

On their debt, here's Charles if you're interested

Expedia’s debt looks high relative to its equity, but it has been coming down in absolute dollars.

  • Total debt: fell from $8.9B in 2021 to $6.5B in 2025—about a 27% reduction.
  • Debt relative to assets: declined from roughly 41% of assets in 2021 to 26.5% in 2025, helped by both debt reduction and asset growth.
  • But leverage ratios still look aggressive: long-term debt is about 470% of shareholders’ equity, and 82.5% of total capital. That means Expedia’s equity base is relatively small, so even a manageable debt balance produces a very high debt/equity ratio.
  • Liquidity is worth watching: the current ratio is 0.80, meaning current liabilities exceed current assets. That is not automatically alarming for a business with recurring bookings and cash inflows, but it leaves less short-term balance-sheet cushion.

Bottom line: this is not a story of debt spiraling upward—Expedia has reduced debt materially since 2021. The concern is that it remains high compared with its thin equity base, while short-term liquidity is below 1.0. I’d characterize it as deleveraging, but still financially leveraged. The next key question is how much cash Expedia holds against that $6.5B debt; the debt figure alone does not tell us the company’s true net-debt position.


Edit: Fled MP because someone has to watch over @cubanpete’s use of live vs life and quiet vs quite, etc.

Also, too many poseurs on MP IMNSHO.

1 Like

As long as they IPO, they’ll get their money and be able to buy capacity from hyperscalers, who can then build out their datacenters and pay nvidia and others and the whole party continues.

2 Likes

Your words into the market gods’ ears, Gríma Wormtongue.

Phil_MCR whispering to the AI market

(Sorry, couldn’t resist :hugs:)

not for you mister :slight_smile: I’m happy to not collect a 2-4-6% dividend on such an appreciation path. It’ll go as long as it’ll go…

1 Like

Is that a picture of the rent collection team?

2 Likes

Sunrise for Goofy, with around 9% forecasted divvies?

mind you

1 Like

I think I’m already paying Sunrise (via Galaxus Mobile).

Thank you for your service! :folded_hands:
I’m also paying them for internet. So maybe they should be paying us instead?

What do we think about a 9% dividend yield without any current profitability?
Apparently it’s OK from cashflow, which telcos should be measured in.

I’m surprised I don’t hate it as much as I thought I would. :wink:

They have a moat (and Swisscom won’t be allowed to buy them) and it looks like their cash flows are mostly in order to pay that dividend. Obviously a tempting juicy dividend.

For my portfolio I’d prefer to see a longer history of a continuous dividend. I’d then even put up with a company that’s likely not going to grow much.

Sales

Charles' Analyis

1. Competitive advantage — what is it, and how durable is it?

Sunrise’s advantage is primarily its Swiss telecom infrastructure, recurring subscription revenue, and customer relationships. Telecom networks are difficult and expensive to replicate, which creates some local scale and switching-cost benefits.

However, the financial data does not yet demonstrate a clearly durable economic moat:

  • Revenue has been essentially flat: CHF 3.04B in 2023, CHF 3.02B in 2024, CHF 2.98B in 2025, and CHF 2.98B LTM (salesRevenue).
  • Operating margin was only 0.2% in 2023, 1.3% in 2024, 1.3% in 2025, and 3.2% >LTM (ebitOperatingIncome / salesRevenue).
  • Net income remained negative: –CHF221M in 2023, –CHF366M in 2024, –CHF112M in 2025, and –CHF151M LTM (netIncome).

The improvement in operating profit is encouraging, but the combination of flat sales, low operating margins, and recurring net losses suggests that the network advantage is being absorbed by high depreciation, financing costs, competition, and/or restructuring effects. I would call the advantage real but only moderately proven as durable.

2. Balance sheet — can they survive a downturn?

The balance sheet is the largest concern.

Debt

Debt has improved, but remains substantial:

  • Total debt: CHF 6.55B at year-end 2024, CHF 5.61B at year-end 2025, and CHF5.68B LTM (totalDebt).
  • Net debt: CHF 6.20B in 2024, CHF 5.34B in 2025, and CHF5.53B LTM (netDebt).
  • Long-term debt excluding leases was CHF3.95B LTM (longTermDebtExclLeaseObligations).

The headline leverage ratios are aggressive:

  • Long-term debt/equity: 125.9% (ltDebtToEquity)
  • Long-term debt/capital: 52.1% (ltDebtToCapital)

The company does have meaningful shareholder equity—CHF4.01B LTM (totalShareholdersEquity)—but tangible book value is deeply negative at approximately –CHF2.82B (bookValuePerShareTangible, gross value). That is typical of highly leveraged telecom businesses with substantial acquired intangible assets, but it leaves limited tangible balance-sheet protection.

Liquidity and coverage

Liquidity is thin:

  • Current ratio: 0.62
  • Quick ratio: 0.57
  • Cash: only CHF152M LTM (cashOnly)
  • Current assets: CHF847M versus total assets of CHF11.52B (totalCurrentAssets, totalAssets)

Cash flow currently provides the main defense:

  • LTM operating cash flow was CHF908.5M (netOperatingCashFlow).
  • LTM capital expenditures were CHF390.6M (capitalExpendituresTotal).
  • That implies roughly CHF517.9M of operating free cash flow before financing.

Coverage is therefore acceptable in the normal operating case, but a downturn would matter. The most recent quarter deteriorated sharply: Q1 2026 showed –CHF25M of operating cash flow and –CHF163M of free cash flow, partly because of a CHF186M working-capital outflow (netOperatingCashFlow, freeCashFlowToEquity, changesInWorkingCapital). The earlier quarters were much stronger, so this may be timing-related—but it shows that quarterly cash generation can be volatile.

Verdict: survivable if cash flow remains near the LTM level, but not a fortress. Debt refinancing, interest costs, and a sustained decline in operating cash flow are important risks.

3. Management quality — good execution or good luck?

There are some positive capital-allocation signals:

  • Debt fell by roughly CHF940M from year-end 2024 to year-end 2025.
  • LTM net debt remains about CHF670M lower than at year-end 2024.
  • Capital expenditures were below depreciation: CHF391M of capex versus CHF1.04B of depreciation and amortization LTM (capitalExpendituresTotal, depreciationAndAmortization).

That helped produce positive LTM free cash flow despite negative accounting earnings. The company also appears to have reduced SG&A from CHF754M in 2023 to CHF619M in 2025 (sellingGeneralAndAdministrativeExpense).

But the record is not clean enough to give management a high score:

  • Net income has been negative for every reported annual period supplied.
  • ROE is –3.7% (returnOnEquity).
  • The reported ROIC of 75.0% (returnOnInvestedCapital) looks unusually high and is likely distorted by the company’s capital structure, accounting base, or unusual operating-period effects. It should not be interpreted as evidence of a 75% sustainable return.
  • The latest LTM net loss is CHF151M, despite positive operating cash flow.
  • Shares outstanding increased from roughly 71.5M in Q1 2025 to 72.8M in Q1 2026 (totalSharesOutstanding), so investors should monitor dilution.

Verdict: management has shown useful deleveraging and cost control, but the evidence is mixed. The results look partly like genuine operational improvement and partly like a leveraged turnaround whose success still depends on maintaining cash flow.

4. Valuation versus growth prospects

Traditional P/E valuation is currently unusable because earnings are negative:

  • The current blended P/E is not meaningful (blended_eps_pe).
  • EPS was –CHF3.05 in 2023, –CHF5.07 in 2024, and –CHF1.56 in 2025 based on the chart and reported epsFullyDiluted.
  • The LTM EPS figure is still negative at approximately –CHF2.08 (epsFullyDiluted, per share).

The forward case depends on a substantial earnings recovery. The chart shows estimated EPS of approximately:

  • –CHF0.26 in 2026
  • CHF1.76 in 2027
  • CHF2.06 in 2028

At a share price of CHF41.68 (current_price), that would represent roughly:

  • 24× 2027 estimated EPS
  • 20× 2028 estimated EPS

That is not obviously cheap if revenue remains flat and operating margins remain low. On the other hand, the data’s forward valuation model says the shares trade approximately 78.8% below forward fair value (forward_valuation). That is a model-based estimate, not a guarantee; it appears to assume a successful earnings normalization.

The key valuation tension is:

  • Positive: debt reduction, improving operating margins, strong LTM cash flow, and a potential return to positive EPS.
  • Negative: flat revenue, negative current earnings, high leverage, negative tangible book value, and a very weak recent share-price trend—–64.1% LTM (price_returns_ltm).

Verdict: potentially attractive as a turnaround, but not plainly cheap on current earnings. The valuation works only if the 2027–2028 earnings recovery materializes.

5. Risks — what could go wrong?

The main risks are:

  1. Debt and refinancing risk. Net debt of CHF5.53B is large relative to the company’s roughly CHF3.0B of annual revenue and CHF909M of LTM operating cash flow.
  2. Low liquidity. A 0.62 current ratio, 0.57 quick ratio, and only CHF152M of cash leave limited room for a prolonged operating shock.
  3. Weak earnings quality or high financing burden. Operating cash flow is positive, but accounting earnings remain negative. LTM net income was –CHF151M, while LTM OCF was CHF909M. The gap may reflect noncash depreciation and other items, but it should not be assumed to be permanently benign.
  4. Quarterly cash-flow deterioration. The latest quarter had –CHF25M OCF, with a CHF186M working-capital outflow. If that weakness persists beyond timing effects, debt reduction could slow or reverse.
  5. Competitive pressure and flat demand. Revenue fell from CHF3.04B in 2023 to CHF2.98B LTM, so the company has not yet shown strong top-line momentum.
  6. Capital-intensity risk. Capex was below depreciation recently, which supports cash flow, but underinvesting in network quality could eventually damage competitiveness. Conversely, a capex catch-up would reduce free cash flow.
  7. Dividend sustainability and data uncertainty. The dividend yield is shown as 8.2% (fg_current_dividend_yield), a level that often signals elevated risk. The dividend history shows CHF3.33 per share in 2024 and CHF3.42 in 2025, but the cash-flow statement reports zero cash dividends paid in 2024 and 2025 (cashDividendsPaid). That inconsistency should be resolved before relying on the headline yield.

6. Dividend coverage

Sunrise does pay a dividend according to the dividend history:

  • CHF3.33 per share in 2024
  • CHF3.42 per share in 2025
  • The chart estimates roughly CHF3.49 per share for 2026

At approximately 72.8M shares, a CHF3.42 dividend would require about CHF249M of annual cash.

Against LTM cash flow:

  • OCF coverage: CHF908.5M / CHF249M ≈ 3.6×
  • Approximate post-capex coverage: CHF517.9M / CHF249M ≈ 2.1×

So, using the dividend history and LTM cash flow, the dividend appears covered by both operating cash flow and free cash flow.

However, there are two important qualifications:

  • The latest quarter produced negative free cash flow of CHF163M.
  • The reported cash-flow statement shows CHF0 of cash dividends paid, despite the dividend-history data showing distributions. The event is also labeled “Dividend payable from reserves or sale of assets” and marked as a spinoff-related event, so the cash-flow classification may not be directly comparable.

Bottom line: Sunrise looks like a leveraged, cash-generative telecom turnaround—not a low-risk income stock. The thesis depends on continued debt reduction, stable operating cash flow, and a return to positive EPS. The dividend is numerically covered on an LTM basis, but the unusually high yield, weak liquidity, negative earnings, and inconsistent dividend-payment data make it unsuitable to treat as a conventional “safe” dividend payer.

Looks like we have yield curve control by the Fed. Debasement trade is not dead yet.

BTW, had you bought 0DTE options for MRNA today, you could have retired. Insane +160% move!

2 Likes

Some optimistic news on Melanoma treatment I believe…they needed some tail winds.

It’s more the proof of concept, melanoma is quite well-served at the moment.

When I started working in pharma consulting my first project was on melanoma, that’s 14 years ago when melanoma was a terrible death sentence, trying to be treated with mustard gas derivatives from WW1, flooding the patient with immune-stimulating cytokines, scratching them with bacteria, washing their insides with chemotherapy.
Essentially it was being lucky to catch it early and cut it out, otherwise it was terrible.

Nowadays, since several very good drugs from Merck, BMS, Roche, Novartis launched it’s gone from that to being able to convert to curable, sometimes even if advanced.

But the proof of concept for Moderna, doing tailored mRNA vaccines for cancer, at scale is enormous, hence reflected in the price jump.

3 Likes

I hold MRK in my dividend portfolio, but it did “only” rise 12.6% yesterday. For Merck this will be just a small part of business while it is more important for MRNA.
:+1:

1 Like